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COMMENTS
Winding Down the Clock: The Statute of
Limitations for Legal Malpractice in
Pennsylvania
I. Introduction
Actions for legal malpractice were once anomalies of very little
interest to the average practitioner or client. In recent years, how-
ever, this minor area of the law has experienced exponential growth,
such that there are few attorneys today who are not affected by the
subject in some capacity-as counsel for a party, witness, or even
defendant.' Frequently, the attorney's first line of defense to a legal
malpractice claim is that the plaintiff's action is barred by the stat-
ute of limitations. This has proven to be the most successful defense,
and the only viable affirmative defense.' As a consequence, the stat-
ute of limitations for legal malpractice should be a matter of great
concern to all lawyers and their clients.
Twenty years ago, the rules governing the limitation of attorney
malpractice actions in Pennsylvania were quite clear. Pennsylvania
courts consistently held that a six-year statute of limitations ap-
plied.' Additionally, these courts adhered to the occurrence rule,
under which the statute began to run at the moment the breach of
duty occurred, regardless of whether the prospective plaintiff suf-
fered consequential damages." Legislative enactments have destroyed
1. McCabe, Legal Malpractice-The Lawyer as a Target, 56 PA. B.A.Q. 209, 210
(1985). According to one of the leading authorities in this area, 90% of legal malpractice
cases reported between 1799 and 1980 were reported in the 1970s. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT,
LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 6, at 18 (2d ed. 1981).
2. D. MEISELMAN, ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE: LAW AND PROCEDURE § 5:1, at 65 (1980).
See also R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 1, § 380, at 426.
3. Belden, Belden & Lappas, Professional Liability of Lawyers in Pennsylvania, 10
DUQ. L. REV. 317, 340-41 (1972).
4. Moore v. Juvenal, 92 Pa. 484, 490 (1880).
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the validity of the former proposition. Likewise, the judiciary, con-
cerned with the perceived injustice inherent in the occurrence rule,
questioned the latter proposition.5 Consequently, a profusion of doc-
trines has resulted, creating confusion for attorneys, clients and
judges.6 More significantly, this confusion undermines the funda-
mental policies that underlie the statutes of limitations.7
The purpose of this Comment is to examine the statute of limi-
tations as applied to legal malpractice suits in Pennsylvania. A brief
history of statutes of limitations is discussed. Special attention is
given to the rationale underlying the limitation doctrine. The appro-
priate statute of limitations for legal malpractice cases in Pennsylva-
nia isexamined. Next, the basic approaches to determining when the
statute begins to run are explored, including consideration of how
each approach furthers or hinders the goals of the statute, with par-
ticular emphasis on the application of each approach by Pennsylva-
nia courts. Finally, possible avenues of reform are considered, includ-
ing both legislative and judicial action, which could clarify this area
of Pennsylvania law.'
II. Statutes of Limitations: History and Theory
Although statutes of limitations can be traced back to Mosaic
law,9 the roots of the modern law of personal action limitations lie in
England. 10 The Limitation Act of 162311 was incidentally designed
5. For a discussion of the occurrence rule and its attendant harshness, see infra notes
34-52 and accompanying text.
6. In Garcia v. Community Legal Servs. Corp., 362 Pa. Super. 484, 524 A.2d 980
(1987), the court felt obliged to admonish the attorneys involved in the case:
We must note that we are surprised and disappointed at the turn of events
in this case. Mrs. Garcia's underlying claim was not filed until the statute of
limitations had expired. Her attorney then brought a malpractice action against
CLS alleging negligent failure to file within the period of limitation, but he also
failed to file within the applicable period of limitation. A professional playwright
would be hooted out of the theater if he employed such an unbelievable plot
device.
Id. at 498, 524 A.2d at 987. But cf. W. SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF JULIUS CEASAR, Act
I, ii, 140-41 ("The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars,/But in ourselves .... .
7. For a discussion, see infra notes 106-14 and accompanying text.
8. This Comment does not discuss specific acts of malpractice; however, for a complete
discussion, see Annotation, When Statute of Limitations Begins to Run Upon Action Against
Attorney for Malpractice, 32 A.L.R.4th 260 (1984).
9. Deuteronomy 15:1-2 (King James) declares:
At the end of every seven years, thou shalt make a release. And this is the
manner of the release: Every creditor that lendeth ought unto his neighbour shall
release it; he shall not exact it of his neighbour, or of his brother; because it is
called the Lord's release.
10. Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1178
(1950).
11. Limitation Act, 1623, 21 Jac., ch. 16.
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to protect impoverished defendants, but its central purpose was to
insure that the King's courts were not cluttered with trivial claims.' 2
In 1713, the General Assembly of the Province of Pennsylvania en-
acted the colony's first statute of limitations.' 3 The law applied a six-
year limitation period to most personal actions, and virtually mir-
rored the language of the Limitation Act of 1623.14
Statutes of limitations have become such an integral part of the
law that modern legislatures seldom define the underlying functions
of such statutes. Consequently, courts are forced to justify the stat-
utes. 5 The primary purpose of modern statutes of limitations is to
protect the defendant. The establishment of periods of time, after
which individuals may safely assume that ancient obligations have
been forgotten, furthers this policy.' 6 Modern statutes are also
designed to bar stale claims and avoid proof problems resulting from
the passage of time, which may destroy evidence and fade memo-
ries. 7 In addition, statutes of limitations serve to penalize claimants
who sleep on their rights by eliminating otherwise valid claims.'
Although statutes of limitations clearly achieve significant goals,
they inevitably lead to some unjust results. Since the period of limi-
tation is arbitrary in nature, some plaintiffs' injuries go unremedied,
while the wrongdoer is protected.' 9 The injustice may be particularly
acute in actions for professional malpractice, in which the plaintiff
may discover that the cause of action exists only after the statute of
limitations has expired. 0 As a result, legislatures and courts should
12. Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, supra note 10, at 1178.
13. Act of March 27, 1713 (1 Sm. L. 76).
14. W. TRICKETT, THE LAW OF LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS IN PENNSYLVANIA § 154, at
205 (1888).
15. Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, supra note 10, at 1185.
16. Id.
17. As the United States Supreme Court recently noted:
Making out the substantive elements of a claim for relief involves a process
of pleading, discovery, and trial. The process of discovery and trial which results
in the finding of ultimate facts for or against the plaintiff by the judge or jury is
obviously more reliable if the witness or testimony in question is relatively fresh
... . [Tlhere comes a point at which the delay of a plaintiff in asserting a
claim is sufficiently likely . . . to impair the accuracy of the fact-finding process
Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 487 (1980). See also Garcia v. Community Legal
Servs. Corp., 362 Pa. Super. 484, 493, 524 A.2d 980, 984 (1987); Med-Mar, Inc. v. Dilworth,
214 Pa. Super. 402, 406, 257 A.2d 910, 912 (1969).
18. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted: "Statutes of limitation are intended to pro-
mote promptness and punctuality in business; the settlement of claims while parties are alive,
and before witnesses die; and he who will not take the hint, must take the consequences."
Campbell's Adm'r v. Boggs, 48 Pa. 524, 526 (1855).
19. Case Comment, Civil Procedure-Statute of Limitations Accrual in Attorney Mal-
practice Actions: Thorpe v. DeMent, 20 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1017, 1022 (1984).
20. Skyline Builders, Inc. v. Kellar, 50 Pa. D. & C.2d 19, 25 (C.P. Leh. Co. 1970).
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periodically examine statutes of limitations and consider whether the
negative ramifications outweigh the beneficial action of the statutory
bar.
III. Selecting the Applicable Statute
Traditionally, Pennsylvania courts applied a six-year statute of
limitations to legal malpractice actions." The Lehigh County Court
of Common Pleas, in Skyline Builders, Inc. v. Kellar,22 was the first
court to explain the rule. The court held that the six-year statute of
limitations for breach of contract actions applied because the attor-
ney's malpractice breached an implied contract with the client.2"
Some attorneys valiantly argued that the two-year statute of limita-
tions that controlled actions for medical malpractice should govern
legal malpractice suits. This argument, however, gained little
acceptance.2
In recent years, the legislature and judiciary have acted to elim-
inate this traditional view. The legislature has virtually amended the
six-year statute of limitations out of existence.25 Because the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court has held that an action for legal malpractice
may be brought under either a tort theory or a contract theory,26
actions for legal malpractice are now governed by a four-year limita-
21. In re Huffman's Estate, 349 Pa. 59, 36 A.2d 640 (1944); Schwab v. Cornell, 306 Pa.
536, 160 A. 449 (1932); Lawall v. Groman, 180 Pa. 532, 37 A. 98 (1897); Owen v. Western
Says. Fund, 97 Pa. 47 (1881); Moore v. Juvenal, 92 Pa. 484 (1880); Morgan v. Tener, 83 Pa.
305 (1877); Rhine's Adm'rs v. Evans, 66 Pa. 192 (1870); Stephens v. Downey, 53 Pa. 424
(1866); Fleming v. Culbert, 46 Pa. 498 (1864); McCoon v. Galbraith, 29 Pa. 293 (1857);
Campbell's Adm'r v. Boggs, 48 Pa. 524 (1855); Miller v. Wilson, 24 Pa. 114 (1854); Downey
v. Garard, 24 Pa. 52 (1854); McDowell v. Potter, 8 Pa. 189 (1848); Derrickson v. Cady, 7 Pa.
27 (1847).
22. 50 Pa. D. & C.2d 19 (1970).
23. The court observed:
In Pennsylvania, the default or malpractice of an attorney has been treated
as a breach of contract between attorney and client: Campbell's Administrator v.
Boggs, 48 Pa. 524; Rhines' Administrators v. Evans, 66 Pa. 192; Huffman Es-
tate (No. 3), 349 Pa. 59. The period of limitations to be applied to such actions
is six years: Act of March 27, 1713, 1 Sm. L. 76, 12 PS § 31.
Id. at 20-21.
24. McCabe, supra note 1, at 215.
25. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5527 (1982) now provides: "Any civil action or proceeding
which is neither subject to another limitation specified in this subchapter nor excluded from
the application of a period of limitation by section 5531 (relating to no limitation) must be
commenced within six years."
26. "Under present Pennsylvania law, an individual who has an attorney-client relation-
ship may sue his attorney for malpractice under either a trespass or assumpsit theory." Guy v.
Liederbach, 501 Pa. 47, 55, 459 A.2d 744, 748 (1983) (an action for malpractice may be
brought against an attorney by a named legatee of a negligently-drafted will as an intended
third-party beneficiary of a contract between the testator and attorney).
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tion for contract actions2 7 or a two-year period applicable to tort ac-
tions.28 The legal malpractice plaintiff should be advised to include a
contract claim in the complaint, in order to benefit from the longer
statute of limitations.29
A series of recent decisions suggests that Pennsylvania courts
are growing disenchanted with basing legal malpractice actions on a
breach of contract theory. As a result, the four-year statute may not
be applied if courts can characterize the plaintiff's legal malpractice
action in such a way as to bring it under the operation of the two-
year statute.3 ° Moreover, a breach of contract count will not be
27. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5525 (1982) declares:
The following actions and proceedings must be commenced within four
years:
(3) An action upon an express contract not founded upon an instru-
ment in writing.
(4) An action upon a contract implied in law, except an action sub-
ject to another limitation specified in this subchapter.
28. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5524 (1982) provides:
The following actions and proceedings must be commenced within two
years:
(3) An action for taking, detaining or injuring personal property, in-
cluding actions for specific recovery thereof.
(7) Any other action or proceeding to recover damages for injury to
person or property which is founded on negligent, intentional, or other-
wise tortious conduct or any other action or proceeding sounding in tres-
pass, including deceit or fraud, except an action or proceeding subject to
another limitation specified in this subchapter.
29. See Garcia v. Community Legal Servs. Corp., 362 Pa. Super. 484, 524 A.2d 980
(1987) (failure to include specific assumpsit count in complaint renders four-year statute
inapplicable).
30. In Moore v. McComsey, 313 Pa. Super. 264, 459 A.2d 841 (1983), a superior court
panel concluded that a plaintiff's cause of action against his public defenders for negligently
handling his criminal case could not be based on breach of contract because "there was no
contract of employment between appellant and trial counsel, for counsel had been court ap-
pointed." Id. at 269, 459 A.2d at 844. The court applied the two-year statute:
Appellant's pro se complaint describes his cause of action in various ways,
but his claim for damages is based upon conduct of counsel which allowed his
conviction and subsequent incarceration. This, in a broad sense, is a claim for
injury to his person. As such, we hold that it must be commenced within two
years.
Id. at 270, 459 A.2d at 844.
In Garcia v. Community Legal Servs. Corp., 362 Pa. Super. 484, 524 A.2d 980 (1987),
the plaintiff accused the defendant of negligently handling her claim against a demolition com-
pany by allowing the statute of limitations to expire before filing the claim. The court noted:
[T]he ordinary meaning of an injury to personal property includes damage
to a chose in action which may be redressed by means of a civil action. Mrs.
Garcia is complaining that her chose in action against the demolition company
was damaged in that she lost its potential value and she is seeking redress
through a civil action.
Id. at 492, 524 A.2d at 983-84. The two-year statute for injury to personal property was held
to apply. Id. See supra note 28.
94 DiCKINSON LAW REVIEW FALL 1989
treated as such if it is based merely on the allegation that the attor-
ney failed to exercise the requisite duty of care. Instead, the plaintiff
must allege either that the attorney failed to follow specific instruc-
tions or that a breach of a specific contractual provision occurred."1
Perhaps it is time for courts to abandon the nebulous contract-tort
distinction and apply the two-year statute consistently.
2
IV. Commencement Doctrines
Once the applicable statute has been determined, the next step
is to determine when the statute begins to run.33 American courts
have applied a variety of rules to determine when the statute of limi-
tations commences in a legal malpractice action. Nevertheless, four
major doctrines currently dominate the field. A split of authority has
recently developed among Pennsylvania courts, with each of the four
major doctrines gaining adherents. Therefore, an examination of
each of these doctrines, and how each balances the fundamental
statute of limitations goals with the basic desire for justice, is
necessary.
A. The Occurrence Rule
The oldest American commencement doctrine, the occurrence
rule, is rooted in the United States Supreme Court's decision in Wil-
cox v. Executors of Plummer.3 " In Plummer, the plaintiffs had re-
tained Plummer to collect on a note.35 Plummer first sued the maker
of the note, Banks, who proved to be insolvent; he then brought suit
against the endorser of the note.36 When the latter action was actu-
ally tried, four and one-half years later, it was discovered that Plum-
mer had erroneously named his client, and a nonsuit was granted.
3 7
Meanwhile, the applicable statute of limitations had run in favor of
the endorser.38 Since Plummer died during this period, the client
brought suit against the executors of Plummer's estate, who offered
31. See Hoyer v. Frazee, 323 Pa. Super. 421, 470 A.2d 990 (1984); Duke & Co. v.
Anderson, 275 Pa. Super. 65, 418 A.2d 613 (1980). See also Koffler, Legal Malpractice Stat-
utes of Limitations: A Critical Analysis of a Burgeoning Crisis, 20 AKRON L. REV. 209, 221-
23 (1986).
32. For a discussion, see infra notes 117-22 and accompanying text.
33. But see Trice v. Mozenter, 356 Pa. Super. 510, 515 A.2d 10 (1986), alloc. granted,
514 Pa. 643, 523 A.2d 1132 (1987) (determination of date of accrual relieves court of burden
of determining which statute applies).
34. 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 172 (1830).
35. Id. at 172-73.




as a defense the expiration of the statute of limitations.89 The plain-
tiffs contended that the statute should not have commenced on the
action against the executors until the plaintiffs suffered actual dam-
age, which occurred when the statute had run on the underlying
claim against the endorser.40 Writing for the Court, Justice Johnson
disagreed, concluding that the cause of action accrued and the stat-
ute of limitations began to run at the time of Plummer's negligent
act (misnaming his client) even though the plaintiffs suffered no ac-
tual damage until later. 1
Pennsylvania quickly adopted the occurrence rule,"2 and it be-
came the dominant commencement doctrine in virtually every
United States jurisdiction."3 The rule is relatively simple to apply
since the court need only determine the date of the defenant's
wrongful act."" Thus, courts do not have to engage in the frequently
arbitrary process of determining when the plaintiff knew or should
have known of the existence of the cause of action, 5 or choosing the
point at which the plaintiff suffered relevant damage. 46 The occur-
rence rule also serves the goal of protecting defendants from stale
claims. 47
Despite its advantages, the occurrence rule has been abandoned
in most jurisdictions.48 Even those that retain the rule appear to lack
legitimate policy reasons for its application. 9 The occurrence rule is
inequitable in professional malpractice actions because the client
often becomes aware of the professional's negligent act only after the
statute has run.50 Similarly, the rule conflicts with the policy of dis-
39. 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) at 174.
40. Id. at 175.
41. Noting that the action against the attorney was based upon a breach of contract
theory, Justice Johnson observed:
When the attorney was chargeable with negligence or unskilfulness, his con-
tract was violated, and the action might have been sustained immediately. Per-
haps, in that event, no more than nominal damages may be proved, and no more
recovered; but on the other hand, it is perfectly clear, that the proof of actual
damage may extend to facts that occur and grow out of the injury, even up to
the day of the verdict. If so, it is clear the damage is not the cause of action.
Id. at 182 (emphasis in original).
42. See Campbell's Adm'r v. Boggs, 48 Pa. 524 (1855).
43. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 1, § 389, at 446; D. MEISELMAN, supra note 2, §
5:6, at 72.
44. Comment, Attorney Malpractice: Towards an Illinois Statute of Limitations, 1982
U. ILL. L. REV. 479, 481.
45. For a discussion of the discovery rule, see infra notes 69-89 and accompanying text.
46. See discussion of the damage rule infra notes 53-68 and accompanying text.
47. Comment, supra note 44, at 481.
48. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 1, § 389, at 451.
49. Id.
50. Skyline Builders, Inc. v. Kellar, 50 Pa. D. & C.2d 19, 25 (C.P. Leh. Co. 1970).
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couraging trivial claims because a client whose attorney has commit-
ted an error may be required to sue before any damage is incurred
and before it is certain that the error will result in any damage.5" In
spite of these defects, Pennsylvania courts continue to adhere to the
occurrence rule, but they endeavor to ameliorate harsh results by
utilizing the discovery rule on a case-by-case basis. 2
B. The Damage Rule
Although the occurrence rule appears to be the leading com-
mencement doctrine in Pennsylvania, at least one court has rejected
the theory that a cause of action for legal malpractice arises at the
moment the negligent act is committed. In Trice v. Mozenter,53 a
panel of superior court judges reasoned that the plaintiff's cause of
action accrued at the time when the elements necessary for a cause
of action were present, including the element of actual damage.54
The damage rule was first applied in Fort Myers Seafood Pack-
ers, Inc. v. Steptoe & Johnson,55 a federal case from the District of
Columbia. The district court applied the occurrence rule and con-
cluded that the action was time-barred. 56 The court of appeals re-
versed the decision, noting that an essential element of any negli-
gence action is proof of injury, and that malpractice is based in
negligence.57 The statute of limitations in a legal malpractice action,
therefore, should run from the moment the plaintiff suffers injury.58
The damage rule is based on the theory that a cause of action
for legal malpractice sounds in tort, not in contract.59 The advan-
tages of the damage rule are evident: (1) it recognizes that legal
malpractice is not much different from other forms of professional
malpractice, and applies the same rule to each;6" (2) it offers further
51. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 1, § 389, at 450-51.
52. See Garcia v. Community Legal Servs. Corp., 362 Pa. Super. 484, 494, 524 A.2d
980, 984 (1987); Moore v. McComsey, 313 Pa. Super. 264, 270, 459 A.2d 841, 844 (1983).
See also notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
53. 356 Pa. Super. 510, 515 A.2d 10(1986), alloc. granted, 514 Pa. 643, 523 A.2d 1132
(1987).
54. 356 Pa. Super. at 517, 515 A.2d at 13.
55. 381 F.2d 261 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 946 (1967).
56. 381 F.2d at 262.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Since the cause of action for negligence accrues at the time of injury, the court
applied the same rule to legal malpractice actions and reasoned: "We see no good reason for
drawing such a distinction between malpractice suits and other negligence actions." Id.
60. A panel of the Pennsylvania Superior Court has offered the following criteria for
determining when a plaintiff may bring a professional negligence action for legal malpractice:
"1. The employment of the attorney or other basis for duty; 2. The failure of the attorney to
exercise ordinary skill and knowledge; and 3. That such negligence was the proximate cause of
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protection to the prospective plaintiff by postponing the time of com-
mencement of the statute in cases where negligence does not result
in immediate injury;61 and (3) the damage rule furthers the goal of
minimizing trivial suits by requiring actual harm to the plaintiff."'
The damage rule has some weaknesses, as well. Naturally, the
rule is less effective than the occurrence rule at protecting the de-
fendant from stale claims.6" The damage rule requires courts to de-
termine the point at which the plaintiff suffered recognizable dam-
age, and is consequently more difficult to apply than the occurrence
rule.6 ' This calculus can become particularly complex when the al-
leged malpractice leads to litigation. Should the statute begin to run
the moment the plaintiff suffers defeat in the underlying litigation,
or should the statute be tolled until the plaintiff exhausts the appeal
mechanism?" The former rule would require the client to take op-
posing positions on the same issue in two simultaneous actions.66 On
the other hand, the plaintiff has incurred actual damage, even if it
amounts to nothing more than the cost of the underlying litigation.67
damage to the plaintiff." Schenkel v. Monheit, 266 Pa. Super. 396, 399, 405 A.2d 493, 494
(1979) (citations omitted). Accord Gans v. Gray, 612 F. Supp. 608, 615 (E.D. Pa. 1985);
Duke & Co. v. Anderson, 275 Pa. Super. 65, 71, 418 A.2d 613, 616 (1980).
61. The damage rule is particularly effective when applied together with the discovery
rule. See infra notes 69-89 and accompanying text.
62. See supra notes 12, 51 and accompanying text.
63. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
64. Boehm v. Wheeler, 65 Wis. 2d 668, 223 N.W.2d 536 (1974), provides a basic exam-
ple of the kind of determination courts must make. In Boehm, plaintiffs alleged that the de-
fendant failed to timely file their patent application and then advised them that it would be
safe to send models of their device to another company. The other company subsequently mar-
keted the device without remunerating them. Id. at 676, 223 N.W.2d at 540. The plaintiffs
urged that they did not suffer injury until the other company began marketing their device. Id.
at 678, 223 N.W.2d at 541. The court did not accept this reasoning, concluding that the
plaintiffs suffered injury with respect to their first claim, for untimely filing of their applica-
tion, when they lost the right to get a patent, id., and were injured by the attorney's negligent
advice when they sent the models to the other company. Id. at 679, 223 N.W.2d at 541.
65. See AMFAC Distrib. Corp. v. Miller, 138 Ariz. 152, 673 P.2d 792 (1983); Neylan
v. Moser, 400 N.W.2d 538 (Iowa 1987) (the statute of limitations should be tolled until the
appellate process is complete). For discussion of this question by a Pennsylvania court, see
Garcia v. Community Legal Servs. Corp., 362 Pa. Super. 484, 496-97, 524 A.2d 980, 986
(1987).
66. Cf. MacGill, Shideler v. Dwyer: The Beginning of Protective Legal Malpractice Ac-
tions, 14 IN. L. REv. 927 (1981).
67. Considerable debate still exists concerning what constitutes "damage" sufficient to
start the statute of limitations running. In Budd v. Nixen, 6 Cal. 3d 195, 491 P.2d 433, 98
Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971), the California Supreme Court held that the cause of action was estab-
lished when the client suffered "appreciable and actual harm." Id. at 201, 491 P.2d at 436, 98
Cal. Rptr. at 852. The court failed to define what was meant by that phrase, and California
has since adopted a statute which confines the court's attention to the fact of harm, rather
than its extent. See infra note 147.
In Jankowski v. Taylor, Bishop & Lee, 246 Ga. 804, 273 S.E.2d 16 (1980), the Georgia
Supreme Court concluded that dismissal of a lawsuit was sufficient to cause actual damage,
even though the statute of limitations had not run on the underlying claim. "Before the dismis-
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Despite these defects, the damage rule continues to grow in
popularity.6 8
C. The Discovery Rule
Pennsylvania courts have recognized the injustice in strictly ap-
plying the occurrence rule when "the attorney has been guilty of
concealment or some act to put his client off guard."'69 In such cases,
the statute of limitations did not run against the plaintiff until the
time the "fraud" was discovered.7" More recently, courts have recog-
nized that the statute should be tolled when the plaintiff is unable to
discover the attorney's negligence, even when the attorney is guilty
of no concealment.
The discovery rule prevents the statute of limitations from run-
ning until discovery of the cause of action is reasonably possible.7"
The plaintiff must use reasonable diligence to become informed of
the facts, and the statute will not be tolled for "mere mistake, mis-
understanding or lack of knowledge. ' 72 Pennsylvania courts have
long applied the discovery rule in cases involving hidden subterra-
nean injuries, 73 medical malpractice, 7  architectural malpractice,7 5
and other personal injuries, 76 but its application to legal malpractice
sal occurred, the plaintiff had a lawsuit pending which was ripe for trial. After the dismissal,
there was no lawsuit pending, court costs would be cast upon the plaintiff and obvious delays
would be occasioned in having the cause of action adjudicated." Id. at 806, 273 S.E.2d at 18.
One commentator has expressed concern that allowing plaintiffs to benefit from tolling the
statute of limitations while they appeal might encourage attorneys who have committed mal-
practice to counsel their injured clients to appeal, wasting the clients' time and money and
discouraging malpractice suits. Kofiler, supra note 31, at 226-27. Courts might prevent this by
simply awarding additional damages to clients whose attorneys have involved them in pointless
appeals.
68. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 1, § 390, at 452.
69. Rhine's Admn'rs v. Evans, 66 Pa. 192, 195 (1870). See also Morgan v. Tener, 83
Pa. 305 (1877); Fleming v. Culbert, 46 Pa. 498 (1864); Campbell's Adm'r v. Boggs, 48 Pa.
524 (1855); Derrickson v. Cady, 7 Pa. 27 (1847).
70. Morgan v. Tener, 83 Pa. 305, 308 (1877).
71. "Likewise, if the existence of the injury is not known to the complaining party and
such knowledge cannot reasonably be ascertained within the prescribed statutory period, the
limitation does not begin to run until discovery of the injury is reasonably possible." Schaffer
v. Larzelere, 410 Pa. 402, 406, 189 A.2d 267, 270 (1963) (citations omitted).
72. Id. at 405, 189 A.2d at 269. See also Walter v. Ditzler, 424 Pa. 445, 227 A.2d 833
(1967); Nesbitt v. Erie Coach Co., 416 Pa. 89, 204 A.2d 473 (1964); McNair v. Weikers, 300
Pa. Super. 379, 446 A.2d 905 (1982).
73. See Smith v. Bell Tel. Co., 397 Pa. 134, 153 A.2d 477 (1959); Lewey v. H.C. Frick
Coke Co., 166 Pa. 536, 31 A. 261 (1895); Gotshall v. Langdon & Co., 16 Pa. Super. 158
(1901).
74. See Ayers v. Morgan, 397 Pa. 282, 154 A.2d 788 (1959); Held v. Neft, 352 Pa.
Super. 195, 507 A.2d 839 (1986).
75. Med-Mar, Inc. v. Dilworth, 214 Pa. Super. 402, 257 A.2d 910 (1969).
76. See Burnside v. Abbott Laboratories, 351 Pa. Super. 264, 505 A.2d 973 (1985);
Irreira v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 231 Pa. Super. 508, 331 A.2d 705 (1974).
LEGAL MALPRACTICE
actions is a recent development.
The first Pennsylvania appellate decision applying the discovery
rule to legal malpractice was Moore v. McComsey."1 Moore was
convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment;
his sentence was affirmed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
1975.78 In 1979, Moore brought suit against his public defenders,
asserting that his conviction and incarceration were a result of their
negligence.7 9 After determining that the two-year statute of limita-
tions applied to Moore's action,80 the superior court noted that the
statute would commence at the time of the negligent act8 1 unless
Moore could bring his case under the discovery rule exception.82
Moore was precluded from relying on this exception, however, be-
cause he failed to explain why he was unable to obtain the requisite
knowledge.88
In Pennsylvania, the discovery rule has been used as a tolling
provision, in conjunction with both the occurrence rule and the dam-
age rule.8 ' The central advantage of the discovery rule is that it re-
lieves the harshness of the general rules by insuring that the plaintiff
is given a reasonable opportunity to detect the attorney's negli-
gence.85 Since the discovery rule is generally used to toll the statute
for other types of professional malpractice actions, applying it to le-
gal malpractice actions serves to promote consistency.86
There are some problems with the discovery rule, however,
77. 313 Pa. Super. 264, 459 A.2d 841 (1983). But see Bowman v. Abramson, 545 F.
Supp. 227, 229 (E.D. Pa. 1982) ("The early case of Derrickson v. Cady, 7 Pa. 27 (1847)
seems to imply that the statute commences when the attorney's negligence is discovered by the
client.").
78. 313 Pa. Super. at 266, 459 A.2d at 842.
79. Id. at 266-67, 459 A.2d at 842.
80. See supra note 30.
81. 313 Pa. Super. at 270, 459 A.2d at 844.
82. Id. at 271, 459 A.2d at 844.
83. Moore argued that his attorneys deceived him by failing to disclose that they had
made mistakes at trial and on appeal which could give rise to a cause of action against them.
The court rejected this argument, noting that Moore was present at the trial, where counsel's
alleged errors were committed, and that those errors were preserved in the public record. The
court held: "Appellant simply failed to act promptly to preserve his rights. He will not be
excused from the consequences of his delay because, as he contends, his public defenders didn't
tell him that they had been negligent." Id. at 272, 459 A.2d at 845.
84. Garcia v. Community Legal Servs. Corp., 362 Pa. Super. 484, 524 A.2d 980 (1987);
Trice v. Mozenter, 356 Pa. Super. 510, 515 A.2d 10 (1986), alloc. granted, 514 Pa. 643, 523
A.2d 1132 (1987); Moore v. McComsey, 313 Pa. Super. 264, 459 A.2d 841 (1983). See also
Skyline Builders, Inc. v. Kellar, 50 Pa. D. & C.2d 19 (C.P. Leh. Co. 1970).
85. "Moreover, to impose upon the client the duty of ferreting out his lawyer's mistakes,
a burden which in the usual situation can be met only by employing a second attorney, is to
discourage the trust and confidence which are essential to a sound attorney-client relation-
ship." Skyline Builders, Inc. v. Kellar, 50 Pa. D. & C.2d 19, 25 (C.P. Leh. Co. 1970).
86. Id.
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which offset the advantages to some degree. The discovery rule
clearly provides less protection to the defendant.8s The discovery rule
is less easily applied than the damage rule because the court is re-
quired to engage in the speculative task of determining when the
plaintiff could reasonably have discovered the attorney's negli-
gence."8 In occurrence rule jurisdictions, a plaintiff may discover the
attorney's negligence before any damage has accrued, in which case
the plaintiff may be required to sue for nominal damages.8 9
D. The Continuous Representation Rule
The fourth major American commencement doctrine is of rela-
tively recent vintage. It is grounded in the "continuous treatment"
doctrine, under which a patient's cause of action against a physician
does not commence the statute of limitations until the doctor-patient
relationship terminates.90 The doctrine was designed to protect the
interests of the patient, who must be able to rely on the doctor's
ability until the case is terminated.9 1 The doctor is also protected by
being given an opportunity to correct his mistake. 2
The continuous representation rule was first applied to legal
malpractice actions in New York.93 Courts recognized that the rela-
tionship between attorney and client involves greater trust than a
physician-patient relationship, since an attorney will not usually ad-
vise the client to seek a second opinion.94 When the occurrence rule
governs, there is some danger that unscrupulous attorneys, having
made mistakes, will assure clients that everything is in order until
87. Comment, supra note 44, at 481.
88. Pennsylvania courts have apparently shifted this burden from the courts to plaintiffs
by requiring that plaintiffs explain why they were unable to obtain knowledge of the cause of
action before the discovery rule will be applied. See Moore v. McComsey, 313 Pa. Super. at
271, 459 A.2d at 845. This may remove some of the concern about potentially unlimited liabil-
ity for attorneys.
89. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 1, § 389, at 450-51.
90. Id. § 391, at 458; D. MEISELMAN, supra note 2, § 5:8, at 81.
91. See, e.g., Keaton Co. v. Kolby, 27 Ohio St. 2d 234, 237, 271 N.E.2d 772, 774
(1971).
92. The New York courts were also concerned with the absurdity of requiring a patient
under a doctor's treatment to interrupt that treatment in order to sue the doctor. See, e.g.,
Borgia v. City of New York, 12 N.Y.2d 151, 156, 187 N.E.2d 777, 779, 237 N.Y.S.2d 319,
321-22 (1962).
93. R. MALLEN & V. LEvIT, supra note 1, § 391, at 458. The rule was first applied by a
trial court, Wilson v. Econom, 56 Misc. 2d 272, 288 N.Y.S.2d 381 (1968), and a month later
by the appellate division, Siegel v. Kranis, 29 A.D.2d 477, 288 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1968).
94. One court noted: "Sick patients often consult several doctors while under treatment
by one but clients rarely consult other attorneys while their case is pending." Wilson v.
Econom, 56 Misc. 2d at 274, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 383.
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the statute has run.95 Perhaps a client's only recourse would be to
hire a second attorney to look over the shoulder of the first, a clearly
unrealistic expectation. 6 The New York courts, therefore, held that
the statute does not begin to run on a client's cause of action until
the attorney-client relationship terminates, at least with respect to
the matter at issue.
97
Pennsylvania courts have never applied the continuous treat-
ment doctrine to medical malpractice cases, although the courts rec-
ognize that cessation of the doctor-patient relationship may serve as
an indication that the doctor has lost the confidence of the patient,
who should, at that point, have reasonably discovered the doctor's
malpractice.98 The superior court, however, has recently suggested
that the continuous representation doctrine may have some applica-
bility in Pennsylvania.99 In Trice v. Mozenter,00 the plaintiff sued
his attorney for malpractice in connection with his conviction in a
criminal matter.101 Trice filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
alleging that he had been prejudiced by inadequate assistance of
counsel."0 2 The writ was ultimately granted and Trice sued the attor-
ney, who asserted the statute of limitations as a defense. 10 3 The su-
95. "The author of the disaster should not be enabled to chart the strategy to avoid the
liability for his own negligence. Otherwise, negligence could be disguised by the device of
delay, and an attorney rewarded by immunity from the consequence of his negligence." Siegel
v. Kranis, 29 A.D.2d at 480, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 835.
96. See supra note 85.
97. The continuous representation rule has gained popularity in other jurisdictions. See
McClung v. Johnson, 620 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981). The Ohio Supreme Court
adopted this rule soon after New York, in Keaton Co. v. Kolby, 27 Ohio St. 2d 234, 271
N.E.2d 772 (1971), but overruled that decision in Skidmore & Hall v. Rottman, 5 Ohio St. 3d
210, 450 N.E.2d 684 (1983), concluding that the discovery rule applied instead. But cf. Vail v.
Townsend, 29 Ohio App. 3d 261, 504 N.E.2d 1183 (1985) (the continuous representation rule
may still serve as a tolling rule).
Some states have adopted this rule in statutory enactments. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC.
CODE § 340.6 (West 1982); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.5838 (Callaghan Supp. 1988). Other
jurisdictions have explicitly rejected the rule. See Boehm v. Wheeler, 65 Wis. 2d 688, 223
N.W.2d 536 (1974) (adoption of the continuous treatment rule is a decision for the legisla-
ture). For an early Pennsylvania case dealing with the continuous representation doctrine, see
Derrickson v. Cady, 7 Pa. 27 (1847) (rejecting the notion that the statute of limitations does
not run until the attorney-client relationship ends).
98. See Held v. Neft, 352 Pa. Super. 195, 507 A.2d 839 (1986); DeMartino v. Albert
Einstein Medical Center, N.D., 313 Pa. Super. 492, 460 A.2d 295 (1983).
99. Pennsylvania courts have historically rejected the continuous representation rule.
See, e.g., Derrickson v. Cady, 7 Pa. 27 (1847).
100. 356 Pa. Super. 510, 515 A.2d 10 (1986), alloc. granted, 514 Pa. 643, 523 A.2d
1132 (1987).
101. Trice was convicted in federal court and sentenced to fifteen years in prison. 356
Pa. Super. at 512, 515 A.2d at 11.
102. Trice claimed that his attorney had acted improperly in failing to obtain informa-
tion concerning whether a voice exemplar, alleged to be that of plaintiff, and an intercepted
recording, the sole evidence linking Trice to the crimes, in fact contained the same voice. Id.
103. Trice's conviction was affirmed by the Third Circuit in 1976. Id. He was released
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perior court found that the statute began to run while the plaintiff
was in prison because the documents he filed in connection with his
pro se appeal indicated that he had a full understanding of his legal
rights. 04 The court also recognized that the plaintiff initiated his
lawsuit seven years after the termination of his relationship with the
attorney. 1°0 The court may have merely intended to suggest that this
was further evidence that the client was aware of his rights long
before he actually brought suit, but the language the court used may
be interpreted as opening the door for the continuous representation
rule. The creative plaintiff's attorney should not overlook this
argument.
V. Defects of the Current Law
There is currently a wide range of opinion about when the stat-
ute of limitations begins to run on a legal malpractice claim in Penn-
sylvania. Two recent decisions adhere to the traditional occurrence
rule, but allow the statute to be tolled in the event that the plaintiff
is able to demonstrate circumstances warranting application of the
discovery rule. 06 Another decision holds that the statute runs from
the time of the damage, although the statute may be tolled under the
discovery rule. The decision also suggests that the continuous repre-
sentation rule may be applicable in Pennsylvania. 0 7 The legal mal-
practice plaintiff may bring suit in tort or contract, 08 but several
superior court decisions suggest that the contract theory is fading
from Pennsylvania jurisprudence. 0 9
The current lack of judicial uniformity in this area serves the
from prison on September 17, 1982, and brought suit on August 9, 1984. Trice v. Mozenter,
356 Pa. Super. 510, 513, 515 A.2d 10, 11 (1986), alloc. granted, 514 Pa. 643, 523 A.2d 1132
(1987). The defendant asserted that Trice was aware of any alleged negligence on the defend-
ant's part by no later than June 30, 1980, when the Third Circuit remanded Trice's habeas
corpus petition for an ineffectiveness hearing. Id. at 513-14, 515 A.2d at 10-11.
104. "Suffice it to say, based on our review of the record, the plaintiff knew or should
have known that he had sustained an injury by the date he signed the Motion, Affidavit and
Memorandum in support of his contention that trial and appellate counsel was ineffective." Id.
at 519, 515 A.2d at 14-15.
105. "We find that, premised on the defendant's cessation of representation of the plain-
tiff in 1977 and the plaintiff's cognizance of his legal rights, as evidenced by the trio of memo-
randa filed with the trial court, that the plaintiff's cause of action bore fruition in 1978." Id. at
520, 515 A.2d at 15 (footnote omitted; emphasis in original). Under either the two-year or
four-year statute, therefore, Trice's claim was barred.
106. Garcia v. Community Legal Servs. Corp., 362 Pa. Super. 484, 524 A.2d 980
(1987); Moore v. McComsey, 313 Pa. Super. 264, 459 A.2d 841 (1983).
107. Trice v. Mozenter, 356 Pa. Super. 510, 515 A.2d 10 (1986), alloc. granted, 514 Pa.
643, 523 A.2d 1132 (1987).
108. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
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best interests of no one. Until unifying principles are set forth, lower
courts will lack guidance and, consequently, plaintiffs and defend-
ants will litigate without direction. 110 Laymen will be suspicious of
judicial action in this area, presuming that decisions are designed
primarily to protect the bar rather than to advance justice."' More
importantly, the fundamental policy choices that underlie the stat-
utes of limitations will be forgotten, while puzzled plaintiffs bring
suit hoping that more liberal rules will soon be adopted and defend-
ants spend time and money to defend against such suits." 2
VI. Approaches to Reform
Change in this area may emerge from either of two directions.
Ideally, the legislature will perceive that the day has arrived when a
fundamental review of the statute of limitations matter is in order.
This appears unlikely, however.'1 Instead, courts will probably con-
tinue to bear the burden of insuring, on a case-by-case basis, that the
statute serves the important goals it was designed to further and that
the interests of justice are not ignored." 4
A. Judicial Action
Any prescription for judicial action must begin with the under-
standing that the legislature has offered very little guidance in the
form of specific statutory enactments. Indeed, the Pennsylvania stat-
ute of limitations does not specifically address malpractice." 6 The
110. For an excellent example of the intricacy that can arise in legal malpractice cases,
see Garcia v. Community Legal Servs. Corp., 362 Pa. Super. 484, 524 A.2d 980 (1987). See
also supra note 6.
Ill. The statute of limitations appears unjust to many nonattorneys, simply because it
deprives plaintiffs of claims which may well be meritorious, for no other reason than the pas-
sage of time. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text. The problem is made more acute
when the rules are unclear, because of the suspicion that judges, as former attorneys, will
juggle the rules in order to protect the profession. Cf. Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart
& Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 190, 491 P.2d 421, 429-30, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837, 845-46 (1971) ("An
immunity from the statute of limitations for practitioners at the bar not enjoyed by other
professions is itself suspicious, but when conferred by former practitioners who now sit upon
the bench, it is doubly suspicious." (footnote omitted)).
112. For a discussion of these policies, see supra notes 9-20 and accompanying text.
113. The Pennsylvania statute of limitations remains quite brief, offering little guidance
to the courts when considering which rule should apply to specific actions, or when the statute
should begin to run. See infra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
114. There are certain benefits in leaving these considerations to the courts. Courts have
greater freedom to be flexible, and to consider exceptional circumstances that may not be
addressable in a legislated rule. As the current Pennsylvania situation suggests, however,
courts will not always be consistent in applying rules, leading to the problems discussed previ-
ously. See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
115. While Pennsylvania courts have been consistent in applying the two-year personal
injury statute, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5524 (1982), supra note 28, to medical malpractice ac-
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statute offers no particular guidance for courts attempting to deter-
mine what event causes the statute to commence.'16 The judiciary
must therefore determine which statute to apply and when the stat-
ute commences.
1. Which Statute.-An action for legal malpractice appears to
involve elements of tort and contract. 117 Because the Pennsylvania
statute offers a longer period of limitation for an action grounded in
contract," 8 the Pennsylvania legal malpractice plaintiff is en-
couraged to file an action in contract, even if the claim sounds in
negligence." 9 If the tort statute has run, a plaintiff may choose to
denominate the claim as one in contract, hoping to take advantage of
the longer statute. Although this strategy may ultimately prove un-
successful, the attorney will be forced to expend time and effort until
the action is dismissed. 2 °
If courts continue to offer plaintiffs the option of suing in tort or
contract, complaints should be carefully examined to ensure that
plaintiffs wishing to take advantage of the longer statute have actu-
ally set forth valid contract claims.' 2' Recent superior court decisions
display considerable creativity in characterizing legal malpractice
claims in order to apply the two-year statute."2 As a result, a day
can be envisioned when Pennsylvania courts will altogether abandon
the practice of recognizing dichotomous claims.
2. When to Commence.-The central question that Pennsylva-
tions, no such consistency may be found in recent Pennsylvania decisions involving legal mal-
practice. See supra notes 21-32 and accompanying text.
116. The Pennsylvania statute of limitations provides for tolling of the statute in the
event of certain occurrences, such as the absence or concealment of the defendant, 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 5532 (1982), or war, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5534 (1982). Absent such circum-
stances, however, the typical preamble to any given section merely states: "The following ac-
tions and proceedings must be commenced within - years[.J" See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 5525 (1982). No indication is given as to what event starts the statute. The courts
must make that determination on their own.
117. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 1, § 382, at 428; D. MEISELMAN, supra note 2,
§ 5:2, at 66-67.
118. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
119. Pennsylvania courts have shown a willingness to look beyond the plaintiff's charac-
terization of the action, in order to arrive at a more realistic view of the nature of the claim.
See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
120. Comment, supra note 44, at 491.
121. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. See also Koffler, supra note 31, at 216-
19.
122. See Garcia v. Community Legal Servs. Corp., 362 Pa. Super. 484, 524 A.2d 980
(1987) (legal malpractice suit treated as suit for injury to personal property); Moore v. Mc-
Comsey, 313 Pa. Super. 264, 459 A.2d 841 (1983) (malpractice suit for negligence leading to
plaintiff's imprisonment characterized as suit for personal injury).
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nia courts must answer is whether the statute begins to run at the
time of the negligent act or at the time the plaintiff suffers damage.
The damage rule, though difficult to apply,2 3 is clearly preferable.
12 4
Although it appears to afford less protection for defendants, it will
relieve defendants of the burden of being sued for nominal damages
by plaintiffs who wish to protect their claims.' 2 5 Tolling the statute
until the plaintiff exhausts the appeal process will further protect at-
torneys from protective claims. 6
As an alternative, courts may choose to adopt a split rule to
accompany the contract-tort dichotomy. Since the occurrence rule is
grounded in the theory that legal malpractice is a contract action, 7
a case could be made for the proposition that a legal malpractice suit
brought on a contract theory ought to be subject to the occurrence
rule. Tort actions could be governed by the damage rule. Such a
division would appear to better protect the defendant than the dam-
age rule alone. This approach, however, fails to effectively deal with
the protective claim.
The discovery rule should continue to apply as a tolling provi-
sion when its use would avert injustice. The rule allows courts a
measure of flexibility, which is valuable in cases involving special
considerations. 28 This rule can function equally well with either the
occurrence rule or the damage rule. 12 9 In its pure form, the discovery
rule requires some potentially difficult calculations by the court, 30
yet this burden may be relieved if the onus of showing good cause
123. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
124. Several recent Pennsylvania decisions have held that an essential element of any
malpractice action, whether brought on a contract theory or a tort theory, is proof of actual
damage. See Mariscotti v. Tinari, 335 Pa. Super. 599, 601, 485 A.2d 56, 57 (1984); Pashak v.
Barish, 503 Pa. Super. 559, 561, 450 A.2d 67, 69 (1982); Duke & Co. v. Anderson, 275 Pa.
Super. 65, 73-74, 418 A.2d 613, 617 (1980). To suggest that the statute should begin to run
before actual damage has been suffered is to suggest that the client must sue before the com-
plaint would survive preliminary objections-leaving the victim of professional malpractice in
a legal catch-22.
For a favorable discussion of Duke & Co., see Koffler, supra note 31, at 221-23.
125. Cf. MacGill, supra note 66.
126. See AMFAC Distrib. Corp. v. Miller, 138 Ariz. 152, 673 P.2d 792 (1983); Rich-
ards Enters., Inc. v. Swofford, 495 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Neylan v. Moser,
400 N.W.2d 538 (Iowa 1987). But see Luick v. Rademacher, 129 Mich. App. 803, 342
N.W.2d 617 (1983) (plaintiffs cause of action accrued when he discovered that attorney en-
tered into consent judgment without his approval; statute not tolled until plaintiff was denied
leave to appeal).
127. "The ground of action here, is a contract to act diligently and skilfully; and both
the contract and the breach of it admit of a definite assignment of date. When might this
action have been instituted, is the question; for from that time the statute must run." Wilcox v.
Ex'rs of Plummer, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 172, 181 (1830).
128. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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why the statute should not commence at the point of damage (or
occurrence) is placed upon the plaintiff.131 The material drawback to
use of this rule is its lack of limit. If the plaintiff can convince the
court that discovery of the cause of action was not reasonably possi-
ble for many years, an attorney (or the attorney's estate) may be
subject to liability after an indefinite period of time has elapsed.132
Finally, the continuous representation rule should be adopted in
some form. The relationship between attorney and client is highly
fiduciary. 33 At the lowest level, the client should be able to invoke
protection if the attorney breaches that trust by acting to conceal or
failing to disclose acts of neglect.134 This rule ensures that the plain-
tiff is not deprived of a rightful cause of action by an attorney who
blithely assures the client that all is well. Protection is also provided
to the attorney who makes a correctable error.' 35 The period of lia-
bility may be limited if the rule protects the client only while the
attorney represents the client in a particular matter. When that as-
pect of the relationship is over, the client might reasonably be ex-
pected to become more alert to the possibility that the attorney acted
negligently.
B. Legislative Action
One of the more significant developments in statute of limita-
tions law is the recent enactment of specific statutes aimed at set-
tling the questions surrounding the accrual rules for legal malprac-
tice.136 Several states have created laws directed solely at legal
malpractice, 3 7 while others have generated statutes covering mal-
131. See Held v. Neft, 352 Pa. Super. 195, 507 A.2d 839 (1986); Moore v. McComsey,
313 Pa. Super. 264, 459 A.2d 841 (1983).
132. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 1, § 394, at 476.
133. "[Tlhe dealings between practitioner and client frame a fiduciary relationship. The
duty of a fiduciary embraces the obligation to render a full and fair disclosure to the benefi-
ciary of all facts which materially affect his rights and interests." Neel v. Magana, Olney,
Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 188-89, 491 P.2d 421, 428-29, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837,
844-45 (1971) (footnote omitted).
134. As the California Supreme Court has indicated, many legal matters are so complex
that the client must rely on the advice of the attorney, lacking any reasonable means of verify-
ing its accuracy. Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d at 188, 491
P.2d at 428, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 844. Of course, some courts adhere to the presumption that all
persons know the law. This can lead to results that are nothing short of fanciful. Compare
Millwright v. Romer, 322 N.W.2d 30 (Iowa 1982) (lay persons held to understanding of rule
against perpetuities), with Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 363 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821
(1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962) (attorney not held to understand rule against
perpetuities).
135. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note I, § 391, at 460.
136. Id. § 387, at 437-38; D. MEISELMAN, supra note 2, § 5:3, at 69.
137. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-574 (Supp. 1988); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.6 (West
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practice actions in general.138 In states that do not have such stat-
utes, courts are free to characterize each case as contract or tort,
applying whatever statute of limitations suits the court at the
time.139
The current Pennsylvania statute of limitations offers little guid-
ance to courts concerning how a legal malpractice action is to be
characterized, what period of limitations should apply, or when the
statute ought to run. As a result, courts have split on these questions,
leaving litigators without guidance. The legislature should take ad-
vantage of the opportunity to establish a uniform rule that will pro-
tect the interests of both attorney and client, as well as further the
policies that underlie statutes of limitations."' The drafters should
examine whether legal malpractice should be subject to different pe-
riods of limitation depending upon whether the claim is grounded in
contract or in tort.14 1 The statute should provide an accrual rule that
is flexible enough to take into account extraordinary circumstances,
yet will not subject the attorney to an indefinite period of potential
liability.
1. Establishing a Uniform Rule.-While an action for legal
malpractice consists of elements of contract and tort actions, it is not
readily apparent why the applicable statute of limitations should de-
pend upon the plaintiff's decision to characterize the action as one in
contract or in tort. Such a practice merely encourages plaintiffs to
statute-shop.14 2 Some states have chosen to continue this distinction
by enacting statutes that apply different limitation periods to con-
1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 753-A (Supp. 1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-206
(1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-14.3 (Supp. 1988); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 15-2-14.2
(1984).
The following statutes, while not aimed solely at legal malpractice, contain language mak-
ing it clear that malpractice actions against attorneys are covered: MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
260, § 3A (West Supp. 1988); NEV. REV. STAT. § 11.207 (1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-3-
104 (1980).
138. The following statutes apply to professionals licensed by the state: IDAHO CODE §
5-219(4) (1979); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.245 (Baldwin Supp. 1988); MICH. STAT. ANN. §
27A.5838 (Callaghan Supp. 1988).
Some states have merely enacted statutes which apply to broad classes of malpractice,
without specifying whether or not they apply to legal malpractice: FLA. STAT. ANN. §
95.1 l(4)(a) (West 1982); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-222 (1985); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 214(6)
(McKinney Supp. 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15 (1983); ND. CENT. CODE § 28-01-18(3)
(Supp. 1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.11(A) (Baldwin Supp. 1987). Courts in these
states have frequently been required to determine whether these general statutes apply to legal
malpractice. See R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 1, § 387, at 441-45.
139. D. MEISELMAN, supra note 2, § 5:3, at 70-71.
140. See supra notes 9-20 and accompanying text.
141. Comment, supra note 44, at 490.
142. See supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text.
94 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW FALL 1989
tract and tort actions. 1 3 Others have abolished the distinction, offer-
ing a single statutory period."'
Ideally, a Pennsylvania legal malpractice statute of limitations
would abolish the tort-contract dichotomy and offer a uniform rule
applicable to all legal malpractice claims. If the statute offers a just
rule of accrual, tolling the statute until the client may reasonably
discover the attorney's malpractice, there is no reason to provide two
separate limitation periods. Such a policy does nothing to protect the
defendant; it does not ensure that the courts will be free of trivial or
frivolous claims.1 5 Further, it is not necessary to prevent injustice to
the plaintiff, who should be able to bring suit within the shorter of
the limitation periods. As long as the statute of limitations is drafted
carefully with respect to such considerations, a single statutory pe-
riod applicable to both tort and contract actions ensures fairness to
both parties.
2. Fixing the Time of Commencement.-The most difficult
task confronting the legislature when creating a statute of limitations
for legal malpractice is establishing a commencement rule which is
uniform but flexible. Many state statutes ignore the issue altogether,
leaving the determination of accrual rules to the courts." 6 The Cali-
fornia statute clearly demonstrates that it is possible for a legislature
to provide for flexible commencement rules. 4 7 This statute currently
143. Comment, supra note 44, at 490.
144. This has become the most popular approach. The Maine statute is quite explicit on
this point, providing that the statute shall apply to "[aictions alleging professional negligence
or breach of contract, for legal service, by a licensed attorney. ... ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
14, § 753-A (Supp. 1988). See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(4)(a) (West 1982); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 413.245 (Baldwin Supp. 1988); NEV. REV. STAT. § 11.207 (1987); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 28-3-104 (1982).
145. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
146. See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 214(6) (McKinney Supp. 1988); OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. § 2305.11(A) (Baldwin Supp. 1987). This, of course, leads to many of the problems
which currently plague the Pennsylvania courts. See supra notes 106-12 and accompanying
text.
147. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 340.6 (West 1982) provides:
(a) An action against an attorney for a wrongful act or omission, other than
for actual fraud, arising in the performance of professional services shall be com-
menced within one year after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of rea-
sonable diligence should have discovered, the facts constituting the wrongful act
or omission, or four years from the date of the wrongful act or omission, which-
ever occurs first. In no event shall the time for commencement of legal action
exceed four years except that the period shall be tolled during the time that any
of the following exist:
(1) The plaintiff has not sustained actual injury;
(2) The attorney continues to represent the plaintiff regarding the
specific subject matter in which the alleged wrongful act or omission
occurred;
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represents the apogee of the legislative enactment, balancing the in-
terests of attorney and client and presenting a commencement rule
which is calculated to be as equitable as possible.
The California statute utilizes both the occurrence rule and the
discovery rule to determine the time of accrual. The plaintiff is enti-
tled to bring an action one year after discovery or four years after
the alleged wrongful act, whichever occurs first. 48 This rule provides
several advantages. First, is provides an outer limit on the attorney's
liability, barring applicability of any of the tolling provisions," 9
thereby assuring the attorney a measure of repose. The plaintiff is
required to act within a reasonable period of time after the malprac-
tice is discovered, in order to encourage plaintiffs to act quickly and
to prevent the evidentiary problems which accompany the passage of
time. The primary weakness of this rule, however, is its failure to
consider the situation in which the plaintiff discovers the malpractice
in the final year of the four-year occurrence rule period. Such a
plaintiff would be denied the full one-year discovery rule period, ab-
sent applicability of one of the tolling provisions. In addition, by fail-
ing to provide explicitly that the statute applies to both tort and con-
tract actions, the statute encourages California courts to apply the
statute only to actions brought in tort. 50
The California statute offers four tolling provisions, which pro-
vide further flexibility and protection for the plaintiff who might oth-
erwise be deprived of an opportunity to recover because of the basic
rule. First, the statute is tolled in the event that the plaintiff has not
suffered "actual injury."' 51 This is a significant provision, and might
(3) The attorney willfully conceals the facts constituting the wrong-
ful act or omission when such facts are known to the attorney, except that
this subdivision shall toll only the four-year limitation; and
(4) The plaintiff is under a legal or physical disability which restricts
the plaintiff's ability to commence legal action.
(b) In an action based upon an instrument in writing, the effective date of
which depends upon some act or event of the future, the period of limitations
provided for by this section shall commence to run upon the occurrence of such
act or event.
By contrast, some state statutes follow the more strict occurrence rule. See ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 753-A (Supp. 1988) (with exceptions for negligence in rendering real
estate opinions and drafting of wills); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 15-2-14.2 (1984).
148. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.6(a) (West 1982).
149. Pennsylvania courts have recently used the discovery rule as a tolling provision. See
supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
150. Despite this fact, the California courts have not hesitated to apply the statute to
contract actions. One court concluded that the legislature "deleted the breach of a written
contract exception from the [statute] because it intended that section 340.6 apply to both tort
and breach of contract malpractice actions." Southland Mechanical Constructors, Inc. v.
Nixen, 119 Cal. App. 3d 417, 429, 173 Cal. Rptr. 917, 923 (1981).
151. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 340.6(a)(1) (West 1982). See also supra note 67 and
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have better served as the basic rule. The tolling provision recognizes
that attorneys' errors do not always result in immediate damages
and allows the plaintiff to wait to sue until damage actually arises.
This offers a particular benefit to victims of negligent draftsmanship
of wills, who may not suffer injury until years after the negligence is
committed. 152 Used as a tolling provision, however, the damage rule
fails to protect attorneys from suits for nominal damages. A plaintiff
who wished to do so could bring suit before suffering any injury,
thereby drawing the attorney into costly litigation.
The second tolling provision enacts the continuous representa-
tion rule, delaying the running of the statute until the attorney has
ceased to represent the client in the specific matter in which the al-
leged malpractice occurred. 153 This provision reflects concern for the
attorney-client relationship, which is one of trust and confidence.
The chance of abuse of trust by attorneys justifies this provision.'"
The remaining two tolling provisions are minor in nature, and
may be unnecessary. First, the statute will be tolled if the attorney is
guilty of "willfully" concealing the wrongful act or omission from
the client. 155 Such a provision would not be beneficial in Pennsylva-
nia, where courts recognize that acts of fraudulent concealment toll
the statute and find the statute tolled when the attorney is guilty
merely of reassurances that lull the client into a false sense of secur-
ity. '5 Finally, the statute will toll if the plaintiff is under a legal or
physical disability that prevents commencement of legal action. 57
The Pennsylvania statute of limitations does not recognize the tradi-
tional legal disabilities, such as infancy, insanity and imprison-
ment, 58 taking the view that infants and incompetents have access
to legal process through their guardians, and those in prison have the
ability to bring suit on their own behalf. 59 This is not an unreasona-
accompanying text.
152. In Millwright v. Romer, 322 N.W.2d 30 (Iowa 1982), the will was drafted in 1944,
The testator died in 1945. In 1978, it was discovered that the will contained a provision which
violated the rule against perpetuities. The court held that the statute of limitations began to
run in 1945, when the testator died. 322 N.W.2d at 33.
153. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.6(a)(2) (West 1982).
154. For a discussion of the continuous representation rule, see supra notes 90-105 and
accompanying text. Michigan has also adopted the continuous representation rule in its mal-
practice statute: MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.5838 (Callaghan Supp. 1988).
155. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 340.6(a)(3) (West 1982).
156. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
157. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.6(a)(4) (West 1982).
158. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5533 (1982) provides: "Except as otherwise provided by stat-
ute, infancy, insanity or imprisonment does not extend the time limited by this subchapter for
the commencement of a matter."
159. See Moore v. McComsey, 313 Pa. Super. 264, 271, 459 A.2d 841, 845 (1983).
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ble policy, considering that the statute of limitations must give some
repose to the attorney. If an infant acquires a cause of action at a
very young age, the attorney may wait years before the statute fi-
nally commences. 60 It is better to require the infant's guardian to be
alert.
Some commentators have criticized the final provision of the
California statute as redundant. 61 This provision delays the statute's
commencement in the case when the cause of action is based on a
written instrument which does not become effective until some future
act or event takes place and starts the statute running on the date
when the act or event occurs. 162 This is primarily designed to deal
with the situation in which a person sues the drafter of a will for
negligent draftsmanship, when such negligence leads to the plain-
tiff's total or partial disinheritance. Some argue that the inclusion of
the damage rule as a tolling provision makes this rule unneces-
sary,16 a but this is not the case. The statute clearly establishes the
date when a cause of action accrues for negligent draftsmanship, a
matter which has been a source of considerable debate among courts
confronted with the situation. 64 Although the California statute
may have chosen the wrong moment to start the running of the stat-
ute in this instance, 65 it should not be criticized for trying to settle
the question.
The California statute represents an excellent attempt to fash-
ion a rule that furthers the basic policies of statutes of limitations
while assuring that plaintiffs are allowed some benefits in the form of
tolling provisions. The Pennsylvania legislature should certainly con-
sider the advantages offered by this statute, but should also consider
the areas in which this statute is based on theories of legal malprac-
160. The situation is more difficult with insanity. Infants cease to be infants within a
specified period of time, either through attainment of majority or by death. Insanity does not
fall under any limitation as to length.
161. See Comment, supra note 44, at 495.
162. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 340.6(b) (West 1982).
163. An intended beneficiary of a negligently-drafted will cannot suffer damage until the
death of the testator, since it is only upon the testator's death that a beneficiary may acquire
rights under the will.
164. See, e.g., Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d 223, 449 P.2d 161, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969);
Shideler v. Dwyer, 386 N.E.2d 1211 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979), vacated and remanded, 417 N.E.2d
281 (Ind. 1981); Millwright v. Romer, 322 N.W.2d 30 (Iowa 1982); Price v. Holmes, 198
Kan. 100, 422 P.2d 976 (1967).
165. If the statute runs at the time of the testator's death, a beneficiary may be forced
to uphold the negligently-drafted provision in one proceeding while fighting it in another pro-
ceeding, leading to problems similar to those encountered when underlying litigation is on
appeal. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
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tice that are outdated or inapplicable to Pennsylvania law."06 The
legislature should consider the advantages and disadvantages of
traditional Pennsylvania rules, and should endeavor to treat lawyers
and other professionals equally, though not necessarily identically.167
VII. A Proposed Pennsylvania Statute
In order to effectively further the underlying policies of statutes
of limitations while assuring that meritorious claims are preserved,
the Pennsylvania legislature should adopt a statute of limitations
designed specifically to cover legal malpractice actions. The follow-
ing proposal abandons the traditional occurrence rule in favor of the
damage rule, and adopts as a limitation period the two-year period
currently applied to tort actions in Pennsylvania. The statute offers
several provisions that toll the running of the statute in exceptional
circumstances, but establishes a more stringent one-year limitation
period when the tolling condition ceases.
The proposed statute provides:
(a) An action against an attorney for a wrongful act or
omission, whether based upon tort or breach of contract, shall be
commenced within two years of the date when the plaintiff suf-
fers actual injury as a result of the wrongful act or omission,
except that the statute shall be tolled under the following
circumstances:
(1) If the plaintiff is unaware of the existence of
the injury, or is unaware of the causal relationship be-
tween the wrongful act or omission and the injury, the
statute shall be tolled until the plaintiff obtains such
knowledge, or through the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence should have obtained such knowledge; the plain-
tiff shall then commence the action within one year.
(2) If the attorney continues to represent the plain-
tiff regarding the specific subject matter in which the
wrongful act or omission occurred, the plaintiff shall
commence the action within one year of the termination
of that relationship.
(3) If the actual injury suffered by the plaintiff
arises in the course of litigation, the statute shall be
tolled until the appellate process is completed or the pe-
riod to file an appeal has passed; the plaintiff shall then
166. Continued reliance on the occurrence rule, though tempered with the utilization of
the discovery rule in the California statute, should not be encouraged in Pennsylvania. See
supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
167. See Skyline Builders, Inc. v. Kellar, 50 Pa. D. & C.2d 19, 25 (C.P. Leh. Co. 1970).
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commence the action within one year.
(b) In an action based upon an instrument in writing, the
effective date of which depends upon some act or event of the
future, the period of limitations provided for by this section shall
commence to run upon the occurrence of such act or event, un-
less tolled by another provision of this section.
This proposal clarifies the limitation period for legal malpractice
actions in Pennsylvania and provides a just balance of the competing
interests which demand recognition. The statute is drafted to include
actions based on contract and tort theories, in order to prevent cli-
ents from resorting to the longer contract statute of limitations. 68
Pennsylvania courts have already noted that clients will bring claims
sounding in tort but labeled in contract. 169 This statute would elimi-
nate benefits from such mislabeling.
The statute offers a flexible commencement rule, recognizing
that a cause of action for legal malpractice does not actually arise
until the plaintiff has suffered actual injury.7 0 Tolling provisions are
included to protect the plaintiff in certain exceptional circumstances.
The discovery rule is adopted as one tolling provision, requiring that
the plaintiff who benefits from the discovery rule must act quickly
once the rule ceases to apply. The continuous representation rule is
adopted in order to afford the attorney an opportunity to correct any
mistakes and to protect the attorney-client relationship. The appeal
rule is designed to prevent the client from being forced to defend the
attorney's work in one proceeding and attack it in another simultane-
ous proceeding.'
7'
The proposed statute's final provision is primarily designed to
confront the particular problems that arise when an intended benefi-
ciary of a will sues the drafting attorney under a third-party benefi-
ciary theory.17 1 Under this statute, the cause of action would arise at
the time of the testator's death. However, the statute would be tolled
in the event, for example, that the plaintiff is unable to reasonably
discover the existence of the attorney's negligence until later. This is
not an uncommon circumstance. Yet, several courts have strictly
held that the cause of action arises at the time of the testator's
death, despite any discovery problems. 173 This statute is designed to
168. See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
169. See, e.g., Hoyer v. Frazee, 323 Pa. Super. 421, 426, 470 A.2d 990, 992-93 (1984).
170. See supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 161-65 and accompanying text.
173. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
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avoid that result.
VIII. Conclusion
Pennsylvania courts, in addition to others throughout the coun-
try, have struggled to balance the policies that underlie statutes of
limitations while preserving meritorious claims when possible. Al-
though just results may be achieved in individual cases, recent judi-
cial attempts to define commencement rules lack uniformity, leaving
lower courts, as well as plaintiffs and defendants, confused as to
when the statute of limitations begins to run in an attorney malprac-
tice case. Recently, many state legislatures have attempted to con-
front this problem by creating statutes specifically designed to apply
to the policy considerations inherent in the legal malpractice area.
The Pennsylvania legislature should not ignore this trend.
By enacting a legal malpractice statute of limitations, the legis-
lature can provide guidance to state courts in the determination of
the date of commencement, while providing uniform rules upon
which both plaintiffs and defendants can rely. The proposed statute
would not entirely relieve courts of making difficult choices in this
area. However, it offers a greater degree of guidance than is pro-
vided by the present statute. In addition, a better balance of flexibil-
ity and uniformity is offered than is provided by the current case law
and statutory law. Issues that have not arisen or have been alluded
to in Pennsylvania decisions are considered. The statute is designed,
not to relieve the courts of the burden of making close calls, but to
provide greater guidance when difficult situations arise.
Kevin M. Downey
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